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Competition Between Auctions 
 
Abstract 
Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in 
the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller 
facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers.  In this paper, we review the state of 
the art of competition between auctions.  We consider three different types of competition: competition 
between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for 
auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis 
of competition between auctions.  
 
Key words: auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Auction research is widespread in many fields of business research, social sciences, computer 
sciences and statistics. These cross-disciplinary approaches to auction research offer fresh angles on 
issues not addressed previously, such as customer retention, relationship development, platform design, 
and novel statistical approaches.  
One reason for the explosion in research is that auctions are increasingly prevalent in all aspects 
of commerce, from procurement of materials and services for production and operations to consumer 
auctions of finished goods. Auctions also have special attraction for government exchanges. Insights 
from auction research are also being applied to other modes of exchange, including two-sided markets, 
posted prices and negotiations.  
Even though auctions capture an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the 
economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple 
buyers or, in the case of procurement auctions, as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. This treatment 
greatly simplifies the theory, but it limits auction theory to monopoly sellers or monopsony buyers and 
fails to consider the interface between these auctions and their market contexts or related auctions. 
There are two primary reasons for the omission of competition in the auction literature. The first is the 
lack of tractability. With the addition of competitive considerations, intractability makes auction theory 
and its insights much less appealing. The second reason is historical. Prior to the advent of the Internet 
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in the 1990s1, consumer auctions were not common but to the extent that they existed (as in art 
auctions, charity auctions and bankruptcy auctions) auctions were in large part isolated events since it 
was costly for consumers to search for alternative auctions. Business and government auctions were 
likewise standalone events. Milgrom (2004) argues that the defining event that changed the auction 
landscape towards consideration of multiple auction events was the rise of FCC spectrum auctions in 
the 1990s.  Both the Internet, in changing consumer auctions, and the FCC initiative, which produced 
the massive academic activity on package bidding, happened around the mid 1990s and therefore (with 
a publication gap) most of the relevant literature is less than 10 years old.   
The focus of this review is on works that attempt to rectify the omission of competition in 
auctions. Our discussion does not assume nor require any knowledge of the broader auction literature, 
but recent practical overviews are offered by Klemperer (2004) and Milgrom (2004).   
We motivate the implication of this omission with two simple and well-known examples. The first 
example is regarding the usefulness of reserve price—a commitment not to sell below some price--  in 
improving seller revenue. There is a consensus among the leading auction theorists (Harris and Raviv, 
1981; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) that reserve 
prices raise the seller's revenue, since they induce higher bids by high-value buyers, outweighing the 
costs of excluding sales to low value bidders. However, now consider two parallel auctions, say on 
eBay, for near-identical items. One has a high reserve price and the other has no reserve price. Which is 
more likely to attract the first group of bidders and gain price momentum? The intuitive answer 
(verified empirically by Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2007a) is that initial bidders will at first 
choose the auction with no reserve price. To the extent that bidders do not switch much between 
auctions (Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2007a), the final price in the auction with no reserve price 
                                                 
1 Milgrom (2004) contends that the defining event that changed the auction landscape towards consideration of multiple 
auction events was the rise of FCC spectrum auctions in the 1990s. We devote some space to package auctions in this 
review, but Internet auctions receive more attention here. These two events took place at precisely the same time—so the 
historical argument remains.   
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will be higher. This intuitive finding reverses an accepted aspect of auction theory. This contradiction 
between established theory and simple common sense, one of numerous such contradictions, is a direct 
result of the omission of competition.  
Our second example pertains to the omission of competition between auction houses. Consider 
the well-known finding by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) regarding sniping in electronic auctions. They 
found that with hard closing times, more bidders submit last second bids—a practice known as sniping. 
Thus, in the hard closing format, sellers face reduced revenues relative to a soft closing rule, whithout  
sniping. The auction house, in this case eBay, stands to lose as well since it collects a percentage of 
sales. Hence, in a market with a single auction house, the choice is clearly to avoid hard closing rules. 
Yet, eBay started out facing competition from Amazon and Yahoo, both using soft closing rules and 
both much bigger financially in terms of user base than eBay at the time. The decision of which closing 
rule to use had to be made with that in mind and eBay selected the hard closing rule2.  
We begin with competition between auctions and consider the simplest form: competition 
between similar items, holding the auctioneer and format constant. Such competition can be between 
simultaneous auctions for the same item, overlapping auctions, or sequential auctions, and can be 
between items by the same sellers (section 2.1) or between competing sellers (section 2.2).  Finally, we 
also consider competition between auctions with complementarities and substitutes (section 2.3). 
 We then extend this discussion to competition between formats, where format differences are 
defined as narrowly as adding a buy-it-now feature or as broadly as moving from an auction to a posted 
price or negotiation (see section 3).  Recent years have seen new auction formats that did not exist 10 
or 20 years ago, when much of the theoretical literature was written. Examples range from new features 
in online consumer auctions, such as buy-it-now options, to procurement variations, including buyer-
                                                 
2 The factors that led to eBay dominating the electronic auction market in the United States over its much bigger rivals are 
numerous and complex. They cannot and should not be reduced to the closing rule decision and we do not wish to do so 
here. Nevertheless, it is clear that every single format decision (and other strategic decisions) made by eBay had to take into 
consideration the actions of its competitors, and in this case the format choice served to both differentiate eBay and to create 
a buzz about sniping. We would also like to emphasize that the implied omission of competition does not affect or detract 
from the results of Roth and Ockenfels. It only sheds a different light on the interpretation of their findings. 
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determined auctions—where the buyer determines the winner -- and partial price visibility formats.  
We also discuss auction format for industrial auctions (section 3.1) and award rules used in these 
auctions (section 3.1.2).   
Lastly, we discuss competition between auction hosts vying for auction traffic (section 4). In such 
platform competition, network externalities, auction design, customization and other considerations 
arise that have not been previously considered in the auction literature. 
Within each section, we highlight the newest methods in the analysis of competition between 
auctions. We identify three primary areas of methodological innovation. (1) Experimental. Empirical 
work on competition between auctions is complicated by imperfect similarities and uncontrolled 
variations. Large differences in auction features may further complicate isolating particular features to 
study. One way to overcome such difficulties is through laboratory or field experiments that carefully 
control irrelevant sources of variation. (2) Statistical. The relationships between price dynamics and 
final prices in auctions of similar items have to be specified. This requires similarity measures, 
specification of price dynamics in unevenly-spaced time intervals, specifications of migration behavior 
between auctions, and the modeling of expectations of future auctions. (3) Analytical. Considerations 
of alternatives by bidders and of competition by sellers must be incorporated into the theoretical 
framework. 
 
2. Competition between Items and Competition between Sellers 
On eBay, it is common to see relatively homogenous items such as popular books and CDs 
offered in simultaneous and overlapping auctions, as well as sequentially over time. Such auctions can 
be differentiated by sellers’ reputation (Bajari and Hortaçsu 2004), the duration of the auction (Haruvy 
and Popkowski Leszczyc 2007a), shipping and terms (Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2007a), 
reserve and secret reserve prices (Katkar and Reiley 2006), the buy-it-now option (Chan, Kadiyali and 
Park, 2006; Park and Bradlow, 2005; Popkowski Leszczyc, Qiu and He 2007; Reynolds and Wooders, 
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2007; Matthews and Katzman, 2006), bid increment (Rothkopf and Harstad 1994), and other features. 
It is important for sellers to understand how various features of their items and the auction format affect 
their competitive positions as well as buyer sensitivity to prices.  Various works have investigated these 
dimensions of differentiation, and we review some here and others in the section on auction formats.  
2.1. Competition between items 
The “law of one price” has been shown to be violated in online auctions. Sun (2005) for example 
showed large price dispersion in 3,164 sequential eBay auctions for identical items. In concurrent eBay 
auctions, Anwar, McMillan and Zheng (2006) find that significant cross-bidding occurs and that 
bidders switch to lower-priced auctions. Nevertheless, not all bidders switch to lower-priced auctions 
and significant price dispersion may still occur in concurrent auctions. In a controlled design, Haruvy 
and Popkowski Leszczyc (2007a) ran concurrent eBay auctions in pairs. Some pairs involved two 
identical auctions and others involved slight variations between the auctions such as minimum bid, 
secret reserve and shipping cost, but otherwise keeping the seller, product, description, and starting and 
ending times identical. They found that roughly 16% of bidders ever placed a bid in a concurrent 
auction, and that of these bids, only 58% were in the lowest price auction. (Random choice would have 
resulted in 50% optimization among a pair of choices.) In a different work, Haruvy and Popkowski 
Leszczyc (2007b) studied choices over pairs of auctions for identical items differing only in the 
percentage donated to charity. Cross-bidding in these pairs was higher at over 20%, and choice of the 
lowest price alternative was not much above 50%. In both of these works, inertia and significant 
heterogeneity was found on that aspect of behavior as well as on charitable intent in the case of charity 
auctions.   Popkowski Leszczyc and Rothkopf (2007) likewise found evidence for heterogeneity in 
charitable intent in a pairwise study of charity auctions.  
In summary, in a competitive marketplace with multiple simultaneous and overlapping auctions, 
relatively few bidders migrate across auctions. After entering a specific auction, few bidders switch, 
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even though they may be able to obtain a lower price in concurrent auctions for identical products. This 
has important implications for auction design, including possibilities of inducements for bidders to 
increase search (Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2007a).  Lin and Jank (2007) further analyze bidder 
migration by breaking down bidder behavior into types of bidders. Reasons for the migration could be 
either previously unsatisfied demand (a losing bid) or bargain hunters who hop from one auction to 
another in search of a good deal. Interestingly, the effect of these different migrating types on the 
auction outcome is mixed. One effect of migration is learning, as migrating bidders obtain greater 
experience and adjust their behavior.  Another point that has not received much attention in standard 
auction theory is that of an auction’s price dynamics and how the dynamics change over the course of 
an auction. In order to study the entire auction-path rather than just its endpoints, Wang, et al. (2006) 
used  Functional Data Analysis (FDA), a method which focuses on set of curves, shapes, objects, or, 
more generally, a set of functional observations. Knowledge of the entire auction-path leads to new and 
useful concepts such as an auction’s velocity or acceleration which allows the researcher to study 
competition in a dynamic setting. In addition, Hyde, Jank and Shmueli (2006) used FDA to create new  
data-visualization tools, known as auction rug plots, to study simultaneous auction price processes. 
Wang, Jank and Shmueli (2007) show that incorporation of an auction’s price dynamics can lead to 
considerable improvements in the accuracy of predictions of interim and final price. Moreover, Bapna, 
Jank and Shmueli (2006) provide more evidence that dynamics exist and matter. Park and Bradlow 
(2005) study bidding behavior over the entire sequence of bids by building a comprehensive descriptive 
model, which models several key components of the bidding process (e.g., whether an auction prompts 
any bids; if so, who bids, when they bid, and how much they bid).   
Jap and Naik (2007) use Kalman filtering estimation techniques to provide a method for 
forecasting interim and final prices and selecting among dynamic bidding models based on point-by-
point data in reverse auctions.   Their approach also aids the buyer’s price discovery process.  
Specifically, given the estimated price distribution from the forecasting model “BidAnalyzer”, the 
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buyer can determine whether a supplier has bid too aggressively (and faces a winner’s curse) or has 
held back (leaving “money on the table”).   
Dynamics in simultaneous or overlapping auctions, where the price dynamics in one auction 
affect the price dynamics in another auction (e.g., Zeithammer 2006), is considerably more complex 
and creates new challenges.  To date, there has not been much work done on this particular challenge 
(see Jank and Zhang, 2007, for some preliminary work). A major challenge of modeling concurrent (or 
simultaneous) auctions is the modeling of (1) a temporal component, consisting of unevenly spaced 
time-series of closing times of auctions, and (2) a spatial component that reflects the distance between 
two products in feature space. Jank and Shmueli (2007) proposed a new solution by applying a spatial-
temporal model.  This model solves the problem of unevenly spaced time-series and includes an overall 
distance measure for combining all quantitative and qualitative product attributes (similar products lie 
in close proximity in feature-space).  The resulting model is estimated within a semiparametric 
framework which allows for a flexible estimation of the many unknown functional relationships. Jank 
and Shmueli (2007) found that temporal price and the effect of similar items both influence final 
auction price.  To model a bidder’s willingness to pay in ascending first-price auctions, Chan, Kadiyali, 
and Park (2007) consider two-dimensional market competition using notebook PC data. They use 
breadth and depth measures to characterize market competition in online auctions. Chan et al. (2006) 
also incorporate these measures in examining sellers’ decisions about whether and where to set buy-it-
now prices. Bradlow and Park (2007) consider a sequence of bids in online auctions with an analogy of 
record-breaking events. Similar to Chan et al. (2007), they find significant negative effects for bid 
increments and variances in both market competition measures. This informs both breadth and depth 
measures and helps bidders better determine bid amounts, reducing the uncertainty in bid increments. 
Learning is another dynamic component and can occur either in the course of an auction or in 
participants’ auction use over time (e.g., Wilcox 2000, Roth and Ockenfels 2002). In an analysis of 785 
online wholesale automotive first price auctions over a 29 month period, Overby and Jap (2007) find 
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that the initial appeal of the online auction for buyers is the reduction of transaction costs (i.e.,  travel).  
But over time, buyers leveraged the reduced search costs associated with these mechanisms to source 
rare vehicles.  Similarly, sellers adapt their use of auction mechanisms, increasingly relying over time 
on online auctions as a means for selling their low condition grade vehicles and physical auctions as the 
primary channel for their better condition grade vehicles. 
2.2. Competition between sellers 
The typical approach to characterizing the equilibrium bids in standalone auctions is to derive the 
bids given a bidder’s knowledge of the other bidders’ value distributions. While some of these 
problems can be complex, their difficulty pales in comparison to the complexity presented by multiple 
competing auctions. We begin with the economics methodology developed in recent years to deal with 
competition between sellers and endogenous entry in auctions. 
Much of equilibrium bidding theory for single auctions assumes an exogenously determined 
number of bidders.  Harstad (1990), Levin and Smith (1994) and Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout (2001) 
extended the theory to incorporate endogenous determination of the number of competing bidders.  
Levin and Smith’s model assumes an opportunity cost of entry that is the same for all bidders, which 
leads to a mixed strategy for the entry decision.  Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout’s model incorporates 
individual-specific opportunity costs that support pure strategy equilibrium entry and bid functions.   
McAfee (1993) studied a dynamic auction market with many sellers and many buyers. He found 
that the equilibrium reserve prices posted by sellers were equal to the sellers’ values and therefore 
efficient. Peters (1997) relaxed McAfee’s assumption of identical sellers and found that in equilibrium 
sellers offered second-price auctions augmented with reserve prices equal to their costs.  
Hernando-Veciana (2005) analyzed seller competition as a multistage game where first sellers 
commit to their reserve prices, then bidders choose one auction to participate in, and then the auctions 
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take place. He showed that it is optimum for sellers to announce reserve prices equal to their costs if the 
numbers of sellers and bidders were sufficiently large. 
McAfee and Vincent (1997) investigated a related problem in which the seller cannot commit not 
to re-auction an object that was not sold. They found that sequential first- and second-price auctions 
were revenue equivalent. Similar to the Coasean dynamics from sequential bargaining settings, they 
found that as the time between auctions went to zero the revenue from the sequence of auctions 
approached the revenue from a single auction with no reserve price. 
A number of theoretical issues concerning competing auctions remain unexplored. It would be 
interesting to find out, for instance, how competition between sellers is likely to affect platform design. 
Also of interest is an analysis of the sellers’ competitive choice of object quality in competing auctions. 
Further, since sellers can often choose the number of objects they auction off, it would be important to 
analyze the competitive choice of objects for sale.  
There is some empirical work on sequential auctions. Donald, Paarsch and Robert (2006), for 
instance, tackle the problem of estimation of the parameters of the distributions of values and of 
participation costs in sequential auctions.  Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) analyze bidding in 
repeated highway procurement auctions using the first-order conditions for optimality. Carare (2007) 
uses a model of search to deduce the effect on bids of imposing a stationary reserve price in sequential 
auctions of identical objects. Using data collected from online auctions, he finds substantial gains in 
revenue from the imposition of a reserve price.  
Most of the theoretical papers discussed above focused on optimal reserve price strategies in 
markets with competing sellers.  The findings of these models generally suggest a single reserve price 
strategy to be used by all sellers.  Empirical analyses conducted by Xie, Elrod and Popkowski Leszczyc 
(2007) indicate that while sellers tended not to adapt to competitor’s strategies, they can be better off 
by differentiating their strategies.  Results of their simulation analyses show optimum reserve price 
strategies under different competitive market conditions.  
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Recent literature has emerged which looks at competition in procurement auctions, where buyers 
and sellers have non-price preferences over each other. In such competitive settings, the problem can 
be reduced to a matching problem. Losing bidders migrate to other auctions and the converged 
outcome can be mapped to a stable outcome where no buyer-seller coalition can block the resulting 
match (see, e.g., Haruvy and Unver 2007; Dogan, Haruvy and Li 2007).  
2.3. Competition with Complementarities and Substitutes 
Buyers often need to purchase a bundle of complementary goods as opposed to individual 
unrelated goods. High complementarities create an “exposure problem” as bidders may be hesitant to 
bid high on items in an efficient bundle if there is a risk of obtaining only part of the bundle. 
 One approach in the auction literature regarding this observation is to assume a single seller 
offering multiple bundles of goods. The seller can then design and enforce customized market 
exchange rules such as various types of combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions are auctions in 
which bidders can place a bid on a combination (“package”) of items.  
Cox, Offerman, Olson, and Schram (2002) experimented with two alternatives for privatizing 
passenger rail service: (a) competition for the rails; and (b) competition on the rails. This research was 
concerned with the properties of alternative auction allocation mechanisms that had to compete for 
political support.  In the on-the-rails scenario, competing train operators bid on rights to use route/time 
slots in a laboratory version of a rail network with multiple route/time slots with passenger demand 
complementarities and substitutabilities.  Rights were allocated with a high-bid, multi-round 
combinatorial auction in which operating companies could bid on any feasible package of route/time 
slots they selected.  The uncertain value of any winning bid was determined by solution of a system of 
network demand equations with a fixed point algorithm.  In the for-the-rails scenario, operating 
companies bid on passenger fare price indexes for pre-specified minimum route/time slot schedules 
with the low bidders being awarded limited-term regional monopolies. The two policy alternatives 
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involving different auction formats were evaluated by the authors with several criteria; the for-the-rails 
alternative with fare index bidding won the political competition at the Ministry.  
A variety of industries have used combinatorial auctions, including truckload transportation, bus 
routes, industrial procurement, and most famously, FCC spectrum auctions (Cramton et al. 2006). In 
spectrum auctions, different bandwidths can serve as substitutes or as complements for different firms. 
Package bidding is intended to minimize the exposure problem, although it may create a “threshold 
problem” if efficient combinations of small bidders are unable to coordinate a response to an 
aggressive package bid by a large bidder.  
Laboratory experiments run by Goeree and Holt (2007) compared simultaneous, multi-round 
auctions and simultaneous multi-round auctions with package bidding. They find that with high 
complementarities, package bidding raises efficiency, but with low complementarities, it reduces 
efficiency.  Using tiered package bidding as suggested by Rothkopf et al. (1998) improves efficiency 
relative to other methods by eliminating problems bidders had in “fitting” complex bids together.   
From the seller’s perspective, combinatorial auctions involve a complex integer programming problem 
to determine the revenue maximizing set of non-conflicting bids and can be computationally 
challenging. Rothkopf et al. (1998) identified several different structures of combinatorial bids for 
which computational tractability was demonstrated and others for which tractability could not be 
guaranteed. For example, they showed that limiting allowable bids to singletons, doubletons, and some 
larger sets allowed for computational tractability. Pekec and Rothkopf (2004) discuss opportunities for 
mitigating computational problems at four points in the auction: before bids are submitted, at the time 
bids are submitted, following bid submission, and after the announcement of tentative winning bids.   
From the buyer’s perspective, the computation is more complex but very interesting potential 
strategies emerge. Jump bidding is a promising direction (Milgrom, 2007). Jump bidding can solve the 
exposure problem by resolving the outcome for one item early on. That is, by putting a bid high enough 
to eliminate some other bidders from that item, a bidder may be able to obtain other items cheaply (as 
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bidders that are now sure they cannot win the first item, they may value the other items less due to loss 
of potential complementarities). Hence, a set of simultaneous auctions with complementarities can be 
transformed to a set of sequential auctions with the use of jump bidding, which in turn changes the 
information structure.  
Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational 
complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. Dealing with 
these two features forces trade-offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency, 
revenue maximization, low transaction costs, fairness, failure freeness, and scalability. Computational 
complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders, by 
maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations, and by limiting biddable combinations 
and the use of combinatorial bids (Pekec and Rothkopf, 2003). 
Zeng, Cox and Dror (2007) argue that the single seller combinatorial auctions apply only to very 
specialized items. The trading rules are too complicated for most sellers to apply and individual sellers 
typically do not offer the entire range of goods for a consumer’s required bundle. From a buyer’s 
perspective, participating in a combinatorial auction requires significant computational expertise not 
possessed by most buyers. Another approach that is likely more applicable in general settings is to 
consider multiple sellers. Zeng, Cox and Dror (2007) develop models of bidding activities across 
multiple existing markets that sell single items to satisfy bundled and combinatorial needs. They find 
optimal bidding functions and outline optimal participation choices through integer programming.  
One difficulty regarding the treatment of complementary auctions by different sellers is that such 
auctions are likely to have an empty core. This means that a coalition of buyers and sellers can block 
the outcome of such auctions by contracting outside the auctions. This could result, for example, in 
unraveling, as manifested in contracts being finalized prior to the auctions.  
3. Competition between Formats, Mechanisms, and Institutions 
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As auctions become a mainstream mode of exchange, sellers in forward auctions and buyers in 
reverse auctions demand and receive more choices of formats. For example, a seller on eBay can 
choose among many auction features. Some of the more researched features are the reserve price and 
secret reserve price (Katkar and Reiley 2006), the buy-it-now option (Chan et al. 2006; Park and 
Bradlow, 2005; Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2007), hard and soft ending (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002), 
and the posted price (Wang, 1993). Buyers in procurement auctions can choose to combine auctions 
with negotiations (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2006), can choose between price and various 
scoring rules for winner determination (Che, 1993), or can choose new formats that limit price 
visibility (and presumably limit opportunism), such as rank-based auctions or auctions where only the 
lowest price is displayed. Sometimes, these auction formats compete indirectly, as participants show 
preference for one over the other. Other times, the various formats compete directly as in cases where 
eBay auctions with different formats are running simultaneously.  
 Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) examined bidder preferences between alternative auction 
institutions. In their experimental investigation, bidders could choose between an ascending auction 
and a sealed bid auction with various entry prices. The number of bidders in each auction format was 
held at two. Varying the entry prices allowed the researchers to determine not only which auction 
institution was preferred but also the monetary value of that preference. They found strong preferences 
for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly when entry prices for the two 
auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects were willing to 
pay more to enter the ascending auction. 
3.1 Industrial Auction Formats  
Competition between formats is evolving especially rapidly in the business-to-business world 
where format choice can be worth billions of dollars in savings. New and innovative format choices 
appear faster than theorists can grapple with.  The main variables under consideration in format choice 
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for procurement auctions appear to be final prices and relationship variables.  By their very nature, 
procurement auctions involve repeated interaction, long-term dynamics, and considerable economic 
stakes.  In these contexts, the relationship between buyers and their supply base can have considerable 
impact on bidding strategies and can be impacted by auction dynamics.  As such, procurement auctions 
cannot  be viewed as standalone auctions the way consumer auctions have often been analyzed.    
3.1.2 Award Rules 
 Unlike consumer auctions, procurement auctions often utilize “buyer-determined” award rules, 
meaning that while the auction provides a format for price competition, the buyer ultimately selects the 
final winner because of non-price considerations such as product quality, supplier responsiveness, and 
other idiosyncratic aspects of the buyer’s needs and circumstances (Jap 2002; Rangan 1998).3   For 
example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Haruvy and Katok (2007) compared buyer-determined and price-
determined auction formats experimentally and found that for a small number of bidders, price-based 
auction formats may provide greater buyer surplus but that buyer-determined auctions provided greater 
buyer surplus for a sufficiently large number of bidders.  Haruvy and Katok (2007) compared dynamic 
and sealed bid auctions with different information structures. They found that sealed bid auctions 
provided greater buyer surplus, and that more transparency to bidders resulted in less buyer surplus. 
However, the use of buyer-determined award rules can be detrimental to the buyer-supplier 
relationship (Jap 2003; Jap and Haruvy, 2007).  Jap (2007) finds that full price visibility English 
(reverse) auctions raise suppliers’ beliefs that the buyer is using such auctions to opportunistically gain 
price concessions. This has resulted in growing interest, by both the marketplace and academics, in the 
use of partial price visibility formats. Using data from over 14,000 auctions, Millet et al. (2004) found 
that revealing the lowest bid and bid rank to suppliers can yield greater price savings than less visible 
formats (i.e., low bid only or rank bid only).  Jap (2007) shows that partial price visible formats (e.g., 
                                                 
3 Many of these attributes may be difficult to express quantitatively, making it difficult to utilize multi-attribute auction 
mechanisms. 
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particularly the rank format over the low price format) are better at preserving the buyer-supplier 
relationship (e.g., minimizing opportunism suspicions, protecting overall satisfaction and future 
expectations) than full price visibility formats.   
The potentially adverse effects of competition and the cost of evaluating the quality of each bidder 
bring a new dimension to the auction literature, raising the possibility that the auctioneer might wish to 
limit the number of bidders invited to participate.  In many industries, suppliers know the number of 
bidders who can quote competitively.  Jap (2007) finds that when the number of bidders in the auction 
is consistent with this number, the buyer-supplier relationship is enhanced; perhaps suppliers perceive 
the buyer as acting fairly, having done its due diligence in bidder selection.  However, when the 
number of bidders is too low or too high relative to the known number of competitive bidders in the 
marketplace, suppliers become more negative toward the buyer.  This may have implications for 
advertising or promotional strategies intended to attract bidders. 
 
4. Competition between auction hosts  
Auction hosts, auction houses, and marketplace operators, whether brick-and-mortar or online, are 
firms whose product is a marketplace in which buyers and sellers can transact, or a platform that 
connects two sides of a market. These firms act as intermediaries between buyers and sellers, similar to 
distribution intermediaries for fixed price goods. Most  auction literature ignores the role of the auction 
host and considers auctions to be an interaction between the owner of an item and the bidders.  
In auction markets, competition exists not only on two sides of a market but also among auction 
operators that provide similar services. One of the factors that determine the result of competition is 
network externalities. Chen et al. (2005) showed, using adaptive agent-based simulations that 
equilibrium exists and that a co-existence equilibrium is more likely to emerge than a monopoly 
equilibrium in online auction marketplaces.  
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When auction marketplaces have different design features, different bidder behavior may emerge. 
Roth and Ockenfels (2002), for example, noted that more sniping, or last minute bidding, occurs on 
eBay than on Amazon. They attributed this behavior to the fixed end time on eBay relative to the soft 
close rule of Amazon. They showed that sniping could be in equilibrium in eBay auctions and that such 
an equilibrium would result in higher buyer surplus relative to a non-sniping equilibrium. Sinha and 
Greenleaf (2000) study the “aggressiveness” of auction bidders, a behavior related to sniping.  
The conditions under which auction markets of different sizes can co-exist in equilibrium were 
analyzed by Ellison et al. (2004). They considered the case of sellers and buyers who choose to 
participate in two uniform auctions.  In their two-stage game, buyers and sellers decide first on the 
auction market they attend. Then buyers learn their valuations and place their bids. An “efficiency 
effect” implies that two auction markets are less likely to co-exist when one of them is “large.” 
However, a countervailing “market impact” determined by the effect on the clearing price of a trader 
switching between auctions suggests that markets of different sizes can co-exist in equilibrium.  
One method  auctioneers use to attract sellers  is price guarantees (Greenleaf, Rao and Sinha, 
1993; Greenleaf et al., 2002). Greenleaf, Rao, and Sinha (1993, hereafter GRS) developed a model of 
negotiations between auction houses and sellers choosing between conventional and guaranteed 
auctions. In a guaranteed auction, the auction house guarantees the seller a minimum amount regardless 
of the auction’s outcome. In return, the auction house charges the seller a higher commission for any 
part of the auction price that exceeds the guarantee. The seller and the auction house negotiate the 
guarantee price and commission; the auction house sets the reserve price for the auction and retains 
ownership of the object if it fails to sell. The main conclusion of GRS is that guarantees make sellers 
better off and auction houses worse off. Greenleaf et al. (2002) show that this result is due to the 
seller’s ability to negotiate guarantees and commissions, and not to the presence of the guarantee itself.  
In the spring art auctions in 2007, Sotheby’s and Christie’s granted some of the largest guarantees 
ever, and this strategy proved successful in a booming art market. In the early 2000s, however, the art 
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auction house Phillips was driven out of business, and forced to reorganize, when it granted excessive 
guarantees to attract business and many of the paintings failed to sell. 
Another tool available to auctioneers is buyer’s premia. Such premia in the art auction industry 
started at 10% in 1975 but are now at 20% for the first $500,000 at major art auction houses, and were 
increased in  2007 to 25% for the first $20,000. Buyer’s premia can increase auction prices because 
many bidders do not fully weight the buyer’s premium, so their perceptions of their total costs are 
lower, an effect observed in other applications of partitioned pricing as well (Morwitz et al. 1998).  
Buy-in penalties (Greenleaf and Sinha 1996) are another practice that auction houses use to 
manage their relations with sellers. These penalties are an amount that the seller must pay the auction 
house if the auctioned property does not sell.  Greenleaf and Sinha model the tradeoff between buy-in 
penalties and the seller’s commissions that auction houses also charge. They find that auctions that use 
them Pareto-dominate auctions that use only sellers’ commissions. The buy-in penalties motivate 
sellers to set lower reserve prices, which increases expected total auction revenue. This result can be 
used to explain why eBay and other internet auctioneers charge sellers a “Reserve Fee” (to use eBay 
terminology) that is refunded to the seller only if the item sells. The reserve fee is a buy-in penalty.   
There are other tools available to auction houses, but an important issue is how much auction 
houses should spend to attract and retain buyers and sellers. This issue has been tackled by Sinha and 
Greenleaf (2001), and Park and Bradlow (2005). Yao and Mela (2007) find that targeting commission 
reductions to high value sellers increases auction house revenues. 
 
5. Directions and opportunities for future research 
Our discussion in this article highlights our view that competition between auctions is an 
important emerging area of research. Since this research is at its infancy, much remains to be done. We 
highlight here the most promising and most urgent directions for future research. 
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We begin with technical and methodological developments that are sorely needed in auction 
research and conclude with opportunities for examining new data sets and addressing new problems.  
Methodologically, one critical need is to map the consideration set of buyers and develop 
similarity measures between auctions (Jank and Shmueli, 2007; Bradlow and Park, 2007; Chan et al., 
2007; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2007a). Unlike brand choice research, where the set of 
competing brands under consideration is generally well-defined, with auctions it is much harder to 
determine what auctions the consumer is choosing between. Auctions running in parallel are not 
identical in object features (e.g., newness, color, memory, warranty), seller features (primarily ratings 
and reputation), message, auction features (opening bid, secret reserve, buy it now option, shipping, 
etc.), and starting and ending times. So a bidder  is not likely to be evaluating all auctions in the set. 
Moreover, the set of close substitutes is not well defined. A distance measure, or nearness, between 
auctions is critical in constructing the set of auctions a bidder is choosing between. The works noted in 
this article and the dimensions they consider are first steps in that regard but there is still a long way to 
go in constructing measures and techniques for this purpose. 
In statistical estimation, the need to examine auction data as a time series (as done in the various 
works by Jank and collaborators, Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, Bradlow and Park, Park and 
Bradlow and Jap and Naik) and not merely as endpoints is paramount in auction research with 
competing auctions. With standalone auctions, one can look at the final price only and ignore the 
dynamics that led to it since the final price is a sufficient and relevant summary statistic of everything 
that happened in the auction. However, with competing auctions, a more relevant statistic would be the 
price relative to competing auctions at the time. Since the number and prices of competing auctions 
change all the time, this comparison has to be made at each point in time. The methods discussed in the 
papers we review here are good first steps but much more method development is needed in this regard. 
Heterogeneity in bidder strategy is an important topic for future research. For example, Haruvy 
and Popkowski Leszczyc (2007a,b) find considerable consumer heterogeneity in search and switching 
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behavior. It is important to identify the relevant consumer segments, relate each segment to a 
consideration set as discussed above, and identify the determinants that influence each segment’s 
choice over auctions and the determinants influential in causing consumers in a given segment to 
switch to another auction.  
Most empirical research on auctions today is done with eBay data which is publicly available 
(although eBay is making it exceedingly difficult to collect it).  The topic of competition between 
auctions allows for the examination of such data with a fresh angle. The methodology introduced here 
of controlled field experiments allows the researcher to obtain such data to examine particular 
questions rather than searching for questions that existing data may answer. The most important 
dependent variable in our opinion is auction choice by consumers given the choice set, and very little is 
known about the determinants of such choice. Combined with the bid itself, this is a complex decision 
about which little is known, but for which the data are easy to collect. 
The area of competition between auctions provides new data opportunities and fresh practical 
problems for auction researchers. One such opportunity lies in industrial auctions (section 3.1). 
Companies, large and small, are increasingly moving their procurement activities online and this 
provides many opportunities for researchers to obtain data. The formats employed in procurement 
auctions are sufficiently different from known formats to justify new groundbreaking research. For 
example, the fact that buyers typically choose the bidder who provides them the highest value rather 
than the bidder with the lowest price is a significant deviation from standard auction formats. The 
design of multi-attribute auctions, which allow a supplier’s bid for a contract to be made up of several 
attributes, of which price is only one, will be an important area of future research. The variations on 
price visibility in dynamic auctions are likewise sufficiently different to warrant investigation. The 
works discussed in section 3.1 are just the tip of the iceberg in uncovering the numerous new formats 
available to procurement managers. An entire literature could emerge from this wealth of new formats.    
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 Competition between auction hosts (section 4) likewise provides interesting data and the 
investigation of such data is long overdue. The art auction market discussed in section 4 is particularly 
fascinating and much of the data on it can be obtained. Equally interesting is the online auction 
competition. While U.S. online auctions are now largely dominated by eBay (Yahoo has retired its U.S. 
auction site and Amazon has neglected its auctions), internationally eBay has less of a lock on the 
market and many markets are still fiercely contested.  Within eBay, competition between formats such 
as between fixed price, dynamic price, or the hybrid buy-it-now option is interesting to study as are 
other types of format competitions mentioned in section 2.  
 Multiple auctions with complementarities and substitutes (2.3) are most notable in FCC 
spectrum auctions. Given the money involved in such auctions, the FCC is spending considerable 
resources on advancing research in the area.  This has resulted in a large stream of research focusing on 
auction formats and mechanisms.  Future research should also study behavioral aspects of competitive 
bidding in these types of auctions.  Finally, research should consider the influence of the make-up of 
different component products on bidder’s willingness to pay for bundled auctions. One interesting 
direction is the work by Popkowski Leszczyc, Pracejus and Shen (2008) who find that value 
uncertainty plays an important role in bundle valuation.  Their findings show that bidders tend to use 
the value of certain items to infer the value of less certain items – this may result in either super-
additivity or (hyper)subadditivity.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Auctions can no longer be viewed as isolated events that are independent of competitive forces 
around them, and of alternative features, formats, or venues. These competitive forces are in no way 
newly emerged or recognized. Two trends in recent years have brought more attention to competition 
between auctions. First, the emergence of larger scale auction markets has made the treatment of 
auctions as standalone events highly impractical and increasingly irrelevant. Second, advances in 
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methodology, partly due to greater computational power, have immensely enlarged the toolkit available 
to the auction researcher—from advanced statistical tools—including functional data analysis, spatio-
temporal models, and Bayesian methods—to simulation studies, more powerful computational tools, 
broader analytical tools, and advances in experimental methods with human subjects.   
It is important to stress that while we divided the topics on competition between auctions into 
three general sections this division is primarily for the benefit of the flow and readability of the article 
and is not meant to imply a real division between these issues. The considerations of one set of players 
are generally taken into account by another, leading to inter-dependencies between the various forms of 
competition. For example, the choice of auction features (e.g., secret reserve price, buy-it-now option) 
is critical for item competition, as it alters preferences over the items. But such choices could be an 
important aspect of seller competition as they pose interesting strategic choices and avenues for 
competition and differentiation.  They are also critical issues for the auction house which determines 
the menu of features available to the seller, taking into consideration seller preferences, which are in 
turn driven by issues pertaining to seller and item competition.  
While the theme of this article is that auctions cannot be viewed in isolation, the approach in 
many of the works we covered is to treat each feature or class of features in isolation. By necessity, 
sellers and auctioneers face tough choices when choosing features and strategies, and the tradeoffs and 
dependencies need to be carefully mapped.  For example, rather than studying the effect of reputation, 
perhaps the correct emphasis should be on the seller’s strategy in pursuing reputation. That strategy in 
turn may depend critically on the choice of features like shipping, insurance, etc.
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